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Employment, Exchange Rates and Labour Market Rigidity
* 
 
There is increasing evidence that the interaction between shocks and labour market 
institutions is crucial to understanding the dynamics of employment. In this paper, we show 
that the inclusion of labour adjustment costs in a trade model affects the impact of exchange 
rate movements on employment. We also explore how labour market rigidities interact with 
the degree of exposure to international competition and with the technology level. Our model-
based predictions are consistent with estimates obtained using panel data for 23 OECD 
countries. Namely, our estimates suggest that employment in low-technology sectors that 
have a very high degree of openness to trade and are located in countries with more flexible 
labour markets are more sensitive to exchange rate changes. Our model and estimates 
therefore provide additional evidence on the importance of interacting external shocks and 
labour market institutions. 
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Globalization has increased the exposure of open economies to external shocks. The
almost instantaneous collapse of international trade in most developed and developing
countries in the last quarter of 2008, caused by the international ￿nancial crisis, is an
instance of how fast the transmission of shocks in the world economy can be. But the
world economy has been a› icted by global shocks before. In the 1970s and in the 1980s,
when the industrialized countries were hit by oil shocks and by the turbulence in exchange
rate markets, following the demise of Bretton Woods, policymakers were vocal about
the impact of external shocks on competitiveness. The steady decline in manufacturing
employment and the increase in unskilled workers￿unemployment contributed to keep
this issue in the headlines ever since. However, policymakers and scholars ￿ see, e.g.,
Nickell (1997), Nickell et al. (2002), Blanchard (1999), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)
and Blanchard and Portugal (2001) ￿ have come to realize that the economic impact of
these and other shocks depends, among other factors, on labour market institutions, a
realization that has led many to urge for the implementation of labour reforms.1
The aim of this paper is thus to investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the
impact of exchange rate shocks on employment and the relation between this impact and
labour market institutions. Our approach brings together two strands of the literature
on international trade. One is composed of the studies, mainly empirical, that ￿nd a
signi￿cant e⁄ect, positively related to the degree of openness to trade, of exchange rate
movements on employment (e.g., Branson and Love, 1988, Revenga, 1992, Gourinchas,
1999, Campa and Goldberg, 2001, and Klein et al., 2003). The other is the new literature
on international trade that builds on the seminal paper by Melitz (2003) and highlights
the relationship between international trade and productivity. A recent example of this
literature is Berman et al. (2009), who add distribution costs to the Melitz model.
By doing that, they are able to show that heterogeneity in productivity across ￿rms
produces di⁄erentiated price and output responses to exchange rate depreciations. Using
the same framework, Alexandre et al. (2009a) go one step further and show how the
degree of openness to trade and the level of productivity interact to determine the impact
of exchange rate movements on employment.
On the theoretical front, the present text provides a link between these international
trade models and the analysis of labour market institutions, and shows how labour mar-
ket rigidities, alongside openness and productivity, mediate the impact of exchange rates
1Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) were among the ￿rst to discuss the implications of di⁄erent labour
market institutions for macroeconomic performance, namely the relationship between employment and
the bargaining structure. Dri¢ ll (2006) updates that study and surveys the recent literature on labour
market institutions and macroeconomic performance.
2movements on employment. The development of our theory rests on the introduction of
labour market frictions, in the form of hiring and ￿ring costs, in a trade model with het-
erogeneous ￿rms and distribution costs of the type developed in Berman et al. (2009).
Our results suggest that higher labour adjustment costs decrease the employment ex-
change rate elasticity, i.e., an increase in labour adjustment costs attenuates the impact
of exchange rate movements on labour demand. In our model, this result is robust to
di⁄erent degrees of openness to trade, productivity and exchange rate persistence.
The themes of labour market institutions and international trade have already ap-
peared together in the new trade literature following Melitz (2003). For example, Fel-
bermayr et al. (2008) added wage bargaining and search frictions to the Melitz model.
Even more recently, Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) presented a two-sector version of the
Melitz model that also includes wage bargaining and search frictions. However, the focus
of these papers is on the comparative statics analysis of the economic implications of
trade liberalization. In fact, the exchange rate is not even mentioned in such papers. We
aim at ￿lling part of this theory gap.
On the empirical side, we estimate the response of employment to exchange rate
movements. We take into account the theoretical results and interact the exchange rate
with measures of openness, productivity and labour adjustment costs. Our proxy for
labour adjustment costs is the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index computed
by OECD, which has previously been shown (see, among other, Cingano et al., 2009) to
be related to labour adjustment costs. We use sector-level data from 23 OECD countries
covering the years 1988-2006. The results seem to corroborate the predictions of the
theoretical model: very open sectors, using a lower level of technology and facing less
labour rigidity are more sensitive to exchange rate movements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop a trade
model with labour market rigidities that take the form of labour adjustment costs. Sec-
tion 3 sets the stage for our empirical test of the model￿ s predictions. There we describe
the main trends and patterns in manufacturing employment, exchange rates and employ-
ment legislation protection in OECD countries since the late 1980s. Section 4 presents
econometric evidence on the e⁄ect of exchange rate changes on employment, in a panel
of OECD countries, and its interaction with openness, technology and labour market
rigidity. Section 5 concludes.
2 A trade model with labour adjustment costs
It has been shown (e.g., Bertola, 1990, 1992) that labour adjustment costs a⁄ect ￿rms￿
optimal decisions, preempt an e¢ cient allocation of resources and, in particular (Bertola,
31992, and Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993), that labour adjustment costs imply lower job
￿ ows.2 In this section we show that in an international trade model one manifestation
of this sort of e⁄ect is that higher labour adjustment costs reduce the size of the labour
demand elasticity with respect to the exchange rate. Our presentation follows Melitz
(2003) and Berman et al. (2009), but we introduce labour adjustment costs into the
framework.
We start by describing the behaviour of the demand for the good that is exported.
To simplify, we assume that the exporting ￿rm only sells in market i. An alternative
interpretation is that the revenues and costs associated with exporting to country i are
separable from the rest of the ￿rm￿ s activities. We also assume, as is common in the
related literature ￿namely, Melitz (2003) and Berman et al. (2009) ￿and, more generally,
in modern macroeconomics, that the ￿rm is a monopolistic competitor. Therefore, the
price and quantity the ￿rm will set will depend on the size of a ￿nite price-elasticity
of demand for the good that the ￿rm produces. In our interpretation of the model￿ s
implications, this elasticity will also represent the degree of openness of country i. The
motivation for this interpretation is that, in a more open market, competition from
similar goods produced by other exporters to market i will be more intense, i.e., the
price-elasticity will be higher. Another paper that also makes this assumption explicitly
is Klein et al. (2003).
2.1 Demand







where ￿ is the discount factor.
The period utility ￿ ow is given by the Dixit-Stiglitz functional:









where ￿ is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties (besides being the
symmetric of the own price-elasticity) and xit(’) is the consumption of variety ’, i.e., ’
indexes, over the set ￿, the goods available to the consumer. Below, we will also use ’
to represent the level of productivity of the ￿rm that produces variety ’. Given the form
2These theoretical predictions have found empirical support in several studies ￿see, e.g., Haltiwanger
et al. (2006) and G￿mez-Salvador et al. (2004).







For our purposes, we do not need to detail any more the behaviour of the represent-
ative consumer in country i. We will assume Cit to be an exogenous element in the ￿rm￿ s
problem, to which we now turn.
2.2 Exporting ￿rm
As we said before, the ￿rm that produces variety ’, and exports it to country i, is a
monopolistic competitor in country i, the sole destination of its output. The price that





where pt is the period t price of the good in the domestic currency, "it is the period t price
of a foreign unit of currency in units of the domestic currency, ￿i are the distribution costs
in country i, measured in units of country i￿ s labour, and wit is the wage in country i, in
period t. The introduction of these distribution costs is the main innovation in Berman
et al. (2009) relatively to the trade model proposed by Melitz (2003). The presence of
distribution costs makes the elasticities of demand for variety ’ with respect to the price
(pt) and with respect to the exchange rate functions of ￿ and of other parameters in the
model, as we shall see below.
As in the related literature, the production function is assumed to be linear in the
labour input:
yt(’) = ’Lt (5)
where ’, as mentioned above, is a measure of productivity. The production costs include
labour costs (given the wage in the ￿rm￿ s country, wt), ￿xed costs and labour adjustment
costs:
ct(’) = wtLt + Ft(’) + wtA(￿Lt) (6)
The focus of this paper is on labour adjustment costs, wtA(￿Lt). For A(￿Lt) ￿
labour adjustment costs measured in units of labour ￿ we adopt the formulation proposed
by Pfann and Verspagen (1989):





5In this formulation, when ￿ 6= 0, labour adjustment costs are asymmetric: if ￿ > 0,
then hiring costs are higher than ￿ring costs; if ￿ < 0, then the opposite is true. The
other parameter, ￿, re￿ ects the symmetric component of the costs of adjusting labour.





~ ￿t [ptyt(’) ￿ ct(’)] (8)
where ~ ￿t is the current period discount factor for the cash ￿ ow in period t. To simplify
the derivations below, we shall assume that ~ ￿t = ￿
t.
































denotes the real exchange rate and Bt includes current and future marginal costs of
adjusting labour:








Mt = ￿ [exp(￿￿Lt) ￿ 1] + ￿￿Lt (13)
The non-linear nature of the model and the fact that Bt includes current and fu-
ture marginal costs of adjusting labour make the analysis of the relation between ￿rm
behaviour and exchange rate movements more complex. To proceed we resort to log-
linearization of equation (10).
2.3 Log-linearization








6i.e., we collect in Xt the exogenous variables that are not directly related to the focus of
our study.3 We then log-linearize the resulting equation, obtaining:






















2 + ￿)Et^ yt+1 (15)
where the hats denote log-deviations from the steady-state. Note that the parameters
related to labour adjustment costs appear together in the factor ￿
2 + ￿. Therefore, in
the log-linearized version of the model, one of them is irrelevant: we chose to set ￿ = 0.
We assume that the exogenous variables ( ^ Xt and ^ qit) follow ￿rst-order autoregressive
processes:
^ Xt = ￿X ^ Xt￿1 + ￿
X
t (16)
^ qit = ￿q^ qit￿1 + ￿
q
t (17)
With these assumptions, the solution of the model is of the form:
^ yt = ￿0 ^ Xt + ￿1^ qit + ￿3^ yt￿1 (18)
The parameter that we are interested in is ￿1, which measures the sensitivity of output





























Though not immediately visible, these formulas lead to four conclusions that interest
us:
3One simpli￿cation we shall make is that the growth rate of wages is zero, which allows us to ignore
the ratio wt+1=wt in equation (12) and to delete a constant slightly di⁄erent from 1 multiplying ￿ in the
results presented below. It also saves us from having to assume a stochastic process for wages, which
would, in any case, end up merged with the corresponding process for Xt.
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Figure 1: Employment exchange rate elasticity
1. an increase in labour adjustment costs (parameters ￿ and ￿) reduces the reaction
of labour demand to exchange rate movements;
2. an increase in openness (￿) increases the reaction of labour demand to exchange
rate movements;
3. an increase in productivity (’) reduces the reaction of labour demand to exchange
rate movements;
4. an increase in exchange rate persistence (￿q) increases the reaction of labour demand
to exchange rate movements.
These conclusions may be gleaned from ￿gure 1.4 In these ￿gures we plot the value
4Figures with additional calibrations are shown in the Appendix, Figures 7, 8 and 9. The plots are
organized in three ￿gures in order to facilitate the evaluation of the e⁄ect of labour adjustment costs
8of ￿1 for di⁄erent parameterizations and using di⁄erent variables in the axis so that the
robustness of the patterns enumerated above may be veri￿ed. The model parameters
were calibrated assuming ￿ = 0:96, ￿ = 0 and s = 0:3, as do Berman et al. (2009) in one
version of their computations. s represents the share of distribution costs in the good￿ s
price. This share has been estimated to represent between 40% and 60% of goods￿prices
￿ see, e.g., Burstein et al. (2003) and Campa and Goldberg (2008). Setting s = 0:5
would not change the plots, only the scale: increasing the share of distribution costs
would reduce the size of the elasticity ￿1.
Our model suggests that empirical analyses of the reaction of employment to exchange
rate movements should ￿nd that low-productivity ￿rms, very open to trade and less
a⁄ected by labour market rigidities should be more sensitive to the exchange rate. In
the empirical section of this paper we will use sector-level data. One of the drawbacks of
using this dataset is that it does not allow us to distinguish between ￿rms that do and
do not export. However, a similar model for non-exporting ￿rms would also lead to the
conclusion that the size of the impact of exchange rate movements on labour demand
declines when labour adjustment costs increase. Therefore, we expect that the same will
happen at the sector level. Note that we do not address the issue of ￿rm entry and exit
(the "extensive margin"). In Berman et al. (2009) ￿xed costs ￿Ft(’) in Equation (6),
assumed to depend on the productivity level ￿are viewed as a payment that allows the
￿rm to export to country i. Thus, in that setup ￿xed costs are important for the study
of ￿rms￿entry and exit decisions concerning the destination market. Berman et al. show
that at the aggregate level these costs will in￿ uence the extensive margin elasticity of
exports with respect to the exchange rate. This is estimated to represent around 20% of
the elasticity of French exports with respect to the exchange rate. We therefore believe
that our model should be able to explain the bulk of the e⁄ect of exchange rate changes
on employment.
3 Labour market institutions, employment and ex-
change rates
In this section, we describe very brie￿ y the main trends in manufacturing employment
per technology level (3.1), aggregate and sectoral exchange rates and openness (3.2) and
employment protection in OECD countries (3.3). We do this to motivate our empirical
analysis that aims at evaluating how employment protection has a⁄ected the impact of
(￿) on the labour demand elasticity with respect to the exchange rate. In each ￿gure the patterns are
similar regardless of the calibration. The plots reveal that adjustment costs have a larger e⁄ect on the
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Figure 2: Employment Share in Manufacturing
exchange rate movements on employment.
3.1 Declining trends in manufacturing employment
Since the beginning of the 1980s there has been a very signi￿cant decrease in manufac-
turing employment. In our empirical analysis we use data for 22 manufacturing sectors
and 23 OECD countries (see Tables 8 and 7 in the Appendix for the description of the
sectors and countries, respectively). Between 1988 and 2006, manufacturing employment
in OECD countries decreased from around 20% to 15% of total employment. However,
trends in manufacturing employment have been very diverse across countries and sectors.
The decrease in manufacturing employment was more pronounced in the US and in the
UK, where it decreased, respectively, from 15.5% to 10.1% and from 18.8% to 10.4% ￿
see Figure 2. On the other hand, manufacturing employment in countries like Italy and
Germany decreased only slightly, remaining close to 20% of total employment in 2007.
When we look at the evolution of manufacturing employment by technology level,
using the OECD technology level classi￿cation, we conclude that low-technology sectors
have been the most a⁄ected by the downward trend in manufacturing employment: their
share in total manufacturing employment declined from 46.3% in 1988 to 39.7% in 2006.
The OECD technology classi￿cation ranks industries according to indicators of techno-
logy intensity based on R&D expenditures (OECD, 2005). Therefore, we use the OECD
10technology classi￿cation as a proxy for the productivity parameter in the production func-
tion of our theoretical model, ’, which can be understood as a total productivity factor
(or a Solow residual). In fact, a simple OLS regression of labour productivity, measured
as sectoral value added per employee, on OECD￿ s technology classes and capital per
employee, shows that high-technology sectors are more productive than low technology
sectors. Given that data on value added and on the stock of capital are available just
for a small sample of countries and years, we develop our analysis using the OECD￿ s
technology classi￿cation.5
3.2 Exchange rates and openness
In the 1990s, exchange rates became less volatile than they had been in the 1970s and in
the ￿rst half of the 1980s. As a result, exchange rate ￿ uctuations in the 1990s caused only
moderate and intermittent concerns. However, the ￿rst decade of the 21st century has
revived concerns about exchange rate volatility, its e⁄ects on global trade and the need
for international policy coordination. In the ￿rst place, the rampant US trade de￿cit and
China￿ s surplus raised doubts on the exchange rate between the dollar and the renminbi.
US policymakers have been accusing Chinese authorities of managing the exchange rate
policy to keep the renminbi undervalued to boost China￿ s exports. The devaluation
of the dollar since 2002 against its main trade partners (see Figure 3) has also raised
concerns about its future role in the international monetary system. Finally, signi￿cant
swings in exchange rates followed the international ￿nancial crisis, either because high
levels of debt raised concerns about the value of certain currencies (e.g., Poland, Hungary
and Iceland) or because governments sought to use the exchange rate to stimulate the
economy through exports (e.g., UK and US).
In Figures 3 and 4, we can observe the evolution of aggregate and sector-speci￿c
e⁄ective real exchange rates for a group of countries included in our empirical analysis.
These exchange rates were computed as trade-weighted rates that include information to
take into account sectoral third-party competition, a procedure described in Alexandre
et al. (2009b), following Turner and Van￿ t dack (1993).6
Figure 5 presents the evolution of openness in the same set of countries, measured as
the ratio of exports plus imports over gross output plus exports and imports. It shows
5Running the following regression log(productivity) = ￿0 + ￿1MHT + ￿2MLT + ￿3LT +
￿4 log(capital) + ￿i + ￿t + ", we conclude that high-technology sectors are the ones with highest pro-
ductivity and that productivity decreases for lower levels of technology (MHT: medium-high tech; MLT:
medium-low tech; LT: low tech). Furthermore, the estimated coe¢ cient on capital is about 0.41 with
a standard error of 0.01. This implies that higher levels of capital are associated with higher levels of
productivity. The R2 is 0.78.
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that between 1988 and 2006 the openness to trade has increased steadily.
3.3 Employment protection legislation
A rapidly changing environment due to increasing competition from emerging countries
and to the acceleration in the pace of technological change has urged industrialized coun-
tries to introduce more ￿ exibility in labour markets ￿these concerns have been specially
strong in European countries. The European Commission, in particular, has recom-
mended on several instances the reform of labour markets, namely of the excessively
restrictive employment legislation, as a necessary condition for making the European
Union the world￿ s most competitive economy as stated in the Lisbon Strategy (see, for
example, European Commission, 2003).
One feature of labour market rigidities is employment protection, that is, the le-
gislation and collective bargaining agreements that regulate the hiring and ￿ring ￿for a
survey of the literature on employment protection see, for example, Addison and Teixeira
(2003). This employment protection represents an additional labour cost for employers
of the type that the model described in the previous section attempts to capture in the
term A(￿Lt). In our empirical analysis, we use the OECD Employment Protection Le-
gislation (EPL) index which allow us to compare the labour market rigidities over time
and across the 23 OECD countries. The OECD measure of employment protection, EPL,
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Figure 6: Employment Protection Legislation
against individual dismissal; indicators of speci￿c requirements for collective dismissals;
and indicators of the regulation of temporary forms of employment (OECD, 1999 and
2004).
As shown in Figure 6, in the last 20 years there was a downward trend in the OECD
EPL index: it decreased from 2.49, in 1988, to 1.91, in 2006, indicating an easing of
hiring and/or ￿ring conditions. France and the UK are among the exceptions; in these
countries the EPL index has increased slightly in the period under analysis. From the
analysis of Figure 6, we can also see that countries with more stringent labour markets
regulations, namely Germany and Denmark, converged to lower EPL index levels, from
3.17 and 2.4 in 1988 to 2.12 and 1.5 in 2006, respectively. However, the EPL index is
still very diverse across countries, and despite the changes mentioned most countries have
kept their relative positions.7 The US, the UK and Canada have the lowest index. The
EPL index for the US has remained unchanged throughout the whole period.
7According to OECD (2004) the regulation of temporary employment is crucial to understanding
di⁄erences in EPL across countries.
144 Empirical evidence
4.1 Estimation strategy
As shown in section 2, our theoretical model implies that the sensitivity of employment
to exchange rate changes should increase with the degree of openness and decrease with
labour adjustment costs and productivity. In order to test these implications we use the
following empirical speci￿cation:
￿yjct = ￿0 + ￿1￿ExRatejc;t￿1 + ￿2Openjc;t￿1 + ￿3EPLc;t￿1
+￿4￿ExRatejc;t￿1 ￿ Openjc;t￿1 + ￿5￿ExRatejc;t￿1 ￿ EPLc;t￿1
+￿6￿ShareChinajc;t￿1 + ￿7￿ShareChinaWjc;t￿1 + ￿8￿ULCc;t￿1
+￿9￿GDPc;t￿1 + ￿10￿IntRatec;t￿1 + ￿t + ujct; (23)
where ￿ is the ￿rst-di⁄erence operator, yjct is log employment, measured as total workers,
in sector j and country c in year t, and ExRatejc;t￿1 is the lagged sectoral real e⁄ective
exchange rate smoothed by the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter8, which ￿lters out the transitory
component of the exchange rate.9 Openjc;t￿1 measures the openness degree and EPLc;t￿1
stands for the OECD￿ s Employment Protection Legislation index.
We include as additional control regressors the share of China in country c imports
of goods belonging to sector j. Similarly, exporters from country c to another OECD
country i face competition from Chinese exporters to country i. This type of competition
is proxied by the Share_ChinaWj;c;t￿1 variable, which is an weighted average of the share
of Chinese imports in OECD countries, where weights are de￿ned as the share of each
























c;t) stands for exports (imports) from country c to country i, in sector j (in
year t). In order to control for possible correlation between sectoral exchange rates and
aggregate variables that are likely to in￿ uence employment growth we include additional
controls for production costs such as Unit Labour Costs, ULCc;t￿1 for labour, and the long
term real interest rate, IntRatec;t￿1 for capital costs. Aggregate real shocks are captured
by the real Gross Domestic Product, GDPc;t￿1, measured in logs10. The composite error
8The smoothing parameter was set equal to 6.25 following Ravn and Uhlig (2002).
9According to our theoretical model, the sensitivity of employment to exchange rate movements
increases to persistence of exchange rate shocks.
10The data of both variables is from OECD.
15term is de￿ned as ujct = ￿jc + "jct, where ￿jc is a set of sector/country speci￿c dummies.
Finally, equation (23) also includes time dummies, ￿t, to account for common technology
shocks that a⁄ect all sectors and countries.
Summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis are presented in Table 1
(variables description is shown in Table 9 in the Appendix). Over the 19 years under
analysis, 1988-2006, within manufacturing sectors employment has decreased on average
1:2% per per year, with a median yearly decrease of 0:9%. The percentiles 25 and 75 of
annual sectoral employment change are ￿3:9% and 2:0%. The dispersion across sectors
is considerable, as the standard deviation is about 0:0857. These simple descriptive
statistics indicate that there have been structural employment shifts. In half of the
sectors/years observations across countries we see a depreciation of the exchange rate,
with the mean change being 0:0007, although with considerable variation: ￿logExRate
￿ uctuates between ￿0:0913 and 0:0947, with a standard deviation of 0:0244. The data
also shows that industries became more open and that labour markets became more
￿ exible. We also observe that China increased its export share in the countries included
in our sample. On average, unit labour costs have decreased over time, the same being
true for the interest rate. Finally, GDP has increased at an average rate of 2:4%.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Logemp 5723 10.8519 1.6975 4.0604 14.7722
LogExRate 5723 -0.0336 0.0989 -0.4142 0.4043
Open 5723 0.4553 0.1898 0.0350 1.0000
EPL 5723 2.2065 0.9638 0.2100 4.1000
ShareChinaW 5723 0.0362 0.0447 0.0000 0.4146
ShareChina 5723 0.0427 0.0714 0.0000 0.7251
ULC 5723 1.0308 0.0625 0.8835 1.2300
LogGDP 5723 14.0023 2.1339 10.3809 20.5785
IntRate 5723 3.7687 1.9641 -3.5641 10.0059
￿Logemp 5723 -0.0120 0.0857 -1.4663 1.2054
￿LogExRate 5723 0.0007 0.0244 -0.0913 0.0947
￿Open 5673 0.0053 0.0272 -0.4091 0.3613
￿EPL 5723 -0.0345 0.1535 -1.0200 0.5000
￿ShareChinaW 5723 0.0039 0.0083 -0.1347 0.1147
￿ShareChina 5723 0.0046 0.0193 -0.4770 0.4722
￿ULC 5723 -0.0054 0.0194 -0.0810 0.0586
￿LogGDP 5723 0.0242 0.0177 -0.0645 0.0691
￿IntRate 5723 -0.2238 1.2419 -7.3470 6.3962
Table 7 provides the list of 23 countries used in our analysis, as well as the number
of observations within countries by technology level. Overall, we have 3295 observa-
16tions for medium-low- and low-technology industries and 2428 observations for high- and
medium-high-technology industries. For some countries the number of observations is
relatively low, particularly for Slovakia, Poland, South Korea, Hungary, Czech Republic
and Switzerland.
Table 2: Observations per country and technology level
Country Low-Tech High-Tech Country Low-Tech High-Tech
Austria￿ 118 100 Hungary 48 6
Belgium￿ 198 106 Italy￿ 202 170
Canada￿ 195 153 Japan￿ 192 159
Switzerland 81 54 South Korea￿ 48 40
Czech Republic 40 39 Netherlands￿ 153 112
Germany 176 142 Norway￿ 185 147
Denmark￿ 193 137 Poland 40 5
Spain￿ 197 158 Portugal￿ 151 110
Finland￿ 202 159 Slovakia 44 40
France￿ 202 170 Sweden￿ 202 168
United Kingdom￿ 136 17 United States￿ 180 150
Greece￿ 112 86
Low-Tech High-Tech
Total observations 3295 2428
Note: OECD23 refers to all countries presented in tableOECD17 refers to countries marked with ￿.
The next section presents the results derived from data for 20 manufacturing sectors,
in 23 OECD countries, covering the period 1988-2006.
4.2 Main results
Table 3: Employment regressions
No-EPL EPL
No-Tech Low-Tech High-Tech Low-Tech High-Tech
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
￿ExRatet￿1 -.2316￿ -.2531￿￿ -.4782 -.0920 -.2613
(.1255) (.1071) (.3396) (.1255) (.3595)
￿ExRate ￿ Opent￿1 .8851￿￿ 1.2085￿￿￿ 1.1815 1.0611￿￿￿ 1.0035
(.3999) (.3981) (.7586) (.3910) (.7655)
￿ExRate ￿ EPLt￿1 -.0697 -.0792
(.0428) (.0986)
Opent￿1 .2257￿￿￿ .0995￿ .3426￿￿ .0993￿ .3435￿￿
(.0815) (.0570) (.1389) (.0562) (.1377)
Continued on next page...
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No-EPL EPL
No-Tech Low-Tech High-Tech Low-Tech High-Tech
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EPLt￿1 -.0158￿￿￿ -.0227￿￿
(.0043) (.0091)
￿ShareChinaWeightt￿1 .0141 -.0626 .2435 -.0638 .2178
(.2000) (.1636) (.4529) (.1652) (.4487)
￿ShareChinat￿1 -.1243￿￿ -.0815 -.3486 -.0820￿ -.3237
(.0606) (.0498) (.2276) (.0498) (.2242)
￿ULCt￿1 .0163 -.1323￿￿ .2003 -.1211￿ .2128
(.0879) (.0626) (.1786) (.0627) (.1750)
￿GDPt￿1 .5959￿￿￿ .7599￿￿￿ .3965 .7800￿￿￿ .4123
(.1269) (.0958) (.2569) (.0939) (.2606)
￿InterestRatet￿1 -.0010 -.0013 -.0008 -.0012 -.0005
(.0012) (.0009) (.0026) (.0009) (.0026)
Countries 23 23 23 23 23
Observations 5723 3295 2428 3295 2428
Adj. R2 .0504 .1068 .0422 .1137 .0444
LogLikelihood 6421.615 5417.503 1975.572 5431.425 1979.432
Notes: Signi￿cance levels: ￿ : 10% ￿￿ : 5% ￿ ￿ ￿ : 1%. Robust standard errors
in parenthesis. All regressions are estimated by ￿xed-e⁄ects at the sector/country level, and
include time dummies. The dependent variable is ￿LogEmploymentjct.
Equation (23) is estimated by the within estimator, with sector/country ￿xed-e⁄ects;
standard errors are robust and clustered within sectors/countries pairs in order to allow
for intra-group correlation. Table 3 shows the results of our estimations. Our ￿rst es-
timates, column (1), do not distinguish for the level of technology and for labour market
rigidities. The results indicate that the employment exchange rate elasticity increases
with the degree of openness. The interaction coe¢ cient is 0:8851 and statistically sig-
ni￿cant at the 5% level (its standard error is 0:3999). The employment exchange rate
elasticity for closed sectors, evaluated at the 10th percentile of openness distribution,
is not statistically di⁄erent from zero (the elasticity is ￿0:032 with a joint signi￿cance
F ￿test p￿value of 0:591). For open sectors, computed at the 90th percentile of openness
distribution, we obtain an elasticity of 0:404 with a corresponding p￿value for the joint
signi￿cance test of 0:028; a 1 percent exchange rate depreciation is associated with a 0:4
percent increase in employment. From our results we can also conclude that more open
18sectors, on average, create more employment: a 1 point increase in the openness index
is associated with an employment increase of 0:23%. Looking to the additional set of
regressors, we observe that imports from China have a negative impact on employment
growth, while, as expected, positive income variations generate further employment gains.
Although not statistically signi￿cant, the unit labour costs (ULC) and the real interest
rate have the expected impact on employment innovations. Throughout our estimations
we are using a sample of 22 industries across 23 countries, as described above, which
correspond to 5723 observations. These are divided between 3295 observations in the low
technology economic activities, and 2428 observations in the high technology industries.
The estimates in columns (2) and (3) account for di⁄erent levels of technology and
columns (4) and (5) include the labour market rigidity variable. We used these results
to quantify the e⁄ects of exchange rate movements on employment in di⁄erent degrees of
openness and labour market rigidities (Table 4). We evaluate the employment elasticity
at the 90th and 10th percentile of openness, Open (+) and Open (-), respectively. For each
degree of openness, and for the models that include employment protection legislation
(EPL), we further evaluate the elasticity from high to low levels of EPL; i.e., at the 95th,
50th and 5th percentiles of EPL.
For low technology and open sectors, Table 4, column (1), the employment exchange
rate elasticity is positive and statistically signi￿cant; i.e., a depreciation induces employ-
ment creation: a 1 percent depreciation induces a 0:61% employment change. However,
for closed sectors, bottom half of column (1), although we obtain a positive elasticity, it
is not statistically signi￿cant (the joint signi￿cance F ￿ test￿ s p ￿ value is about 0:7).11.
Looking to the additional controls(column (3), Table 3), imports from China have a
negative impact on OECD￿ s manufacturing employment, although marginally not stat-
istically signi￿cant. The unit labour costs have a signi￿cant impact on employment: a 1
point increase implies a 13% employment decrease. GDP growth has the expected pos-
itive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on employment, while the real interest rate does not interfere
with employment movements, once we control for the other explanatory variables. These
results show that exchange rate shocks play a role in the determination of employment
changes. Furthermore, its e⁄ects are higher the higher the degree of openness.
From column (3), Table 3, we conclude that for high technology sectors the employ-
ment exchange rate does not vary with the degree of openness: the interaction term is
estimated to be about 1:18, with a standard error of 0:76. Altogether, the employment
exchange rate elasticity is not statistically signi￿cant (Table 4, column (3), top half),
with an estimated magnitude of 0:37. Therefore, exchange rate movements seem to play
11The null hypothesis under analysis is H0 : ￿1 + ￿4Open95 = 0, where Open95 is the 95th openness
percentile. The F statistic is 9:72.
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Low-Tech High-Tech





























Notes: p ￿ values in parenthesis. Signi￿cance levels: ￿ : 10% ￿￿ : 5%
￿ ￿ ￿ : 1%.
a crucial role in the determination of employment for low productivity and open indus-
tries, while it appears insigni￿cant in the high productivity sectors and is in line with
the one discussed in Alexandre et al. (2009a). The additional control variables shown in
Table 3, column (3), are not statistically signi￿cant.
The inclusion of the EPL information in our regressions brings interesting results.
First, for Low-Tech sectors, the e⁄ect of the exchange rate on employment is higher for
more open industries that face a higher ￿ exibility in the labour market (column (4), Table
3). The coe¢ cient on ￿ExRatejc;t￿1 ￿ EPLc;t￿1 is marginally non signi￿cant, with a
magnitude of ￿0:0697 and a standard error of 0:0428. We reinforce the result discussed
above that exchange rate e⁄ects are enhanced for higher degrees of openness. On its
own, openness is associated with employment creation (a 1 point increase in openness
increases employment by 0:1%), while labour market rigidities (higher EPL) relates to
negative employment variations (a 1 point increase in EPL implies a 1:6% employment
decrease).12 The corresponding employment exchange rate elasticities reported in Table
4, column (2), reveal the following: for highly open sectors, top half of column (2), the
elasticity is positive and signi￿cant and decreases with labour market rigidity. It goes
from 0:62, for Low-Tech sectors with a degree of openness equal to its 90th percentile and
an EPL evaluated at its 5th percentile, to 0:43 with an EPL evaluated at the 95th with
the same degree of openness. For example, for Low-Tech, very open sectors, facing rigid
labour markets, a 1% depreciation of the exchange rate is associated with an average
12The annual average change in EPL is ￿0:023, with a standard deviation of 0:137. The induced
employment change would be ￿0:023 ￿ (￿0:0158) ’ 0:036%.
20employment increase of about 0:43%. Turning our attention to closed sectors we observe
that in face of ￿ exible labour markets the employment exchange rate elasticity is 0:0949,
and marginally non-signi￿cant (the standard error is 0:1030). With the increase in the
degree of rigidity the exchange rate e⁄ects on employment become clearly insigni￿cant.
The results for the additional covariates provide a consistent story: (i) competition from
China a⁄ects negatively employment changes, (ii) an increase in the unit labour costs
reduces employment, and (iii) income positive variations are associated with employment
creation; a 1% increase in GDP created 0:78% more employment.
For High-Tech industries, column (5), Table 3, both openness and labour market ri-
gidities do not play on the e⁄ect of exchange rate innovations on employment variations.
At the same time, the employment exchange rate elasticity, Table 4, column (4), is not
signi￿cant. An interesting result is the one where in very open High-Tech industries with
￿ exible labour markets, the employment exchange rate elasticity is about 0:4, and margin-
ally non-signi￿cant at the 10% level (the associated p ￿ value is 0:1089). Such elasticity
is still about 2/3 of the one obtained for Low-Tech industries. These results con￿rm
the conclusion that exchange rate movements are particularly relevant for employment
determination in low productivity sectors and these e⁄ects decrease monotonically with
labour market rigidity. Also, openness has an important e⁄ect on employment variations;
for example, a 1 point increase in the openness index implies a variation of about 0:34%
in employment (Table 3, column 5), and labour market rigidities are associated with an
employment reductions; a 1 point increase in EPL decreases employment by 2:3%. For
High-Tech sectors the additional set of regressors does not seem to play a relevant role.
Finally, looking to the overall signi￿cance of the regressions presented in Table 3,
we conclude that our model is more successful in explaining employment movements for
Low-Tech industries. An adjusted R2 of 11% for Low-Tech (columns 2 and 4) compares
to 4% for High-Tech (columns 3 and 5). This conclusion is reinforced by the analysis of
the loglikelihood.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
In what follows we discuss two alternative speci￿cations of equation (23). We extend the
estimates presented in columns (4) and (5) of Table 3 by, ￿rst, replacing Openjc;t￿1 and
EPLc;t￿1 by their ￿rst-di⁄erences counterparts, and, second, eliminating these variables
from our speci￿cation, while keeping their interactions with the exchange rate. The
estimates, and corresponding elasticities, are presented in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.
The new set of estimates indicates that there are no major changes in our results.
Some of the estimates, and corresponding elasticities, become statistically signi￿cant,
21reinforcing the results discussed in the previous section. By including both openness and
EPL in lagged changes, instead of levels, we now observe that for High-Tech the exchange
rate e⁄ects are also mediated by the degree of openness. This results is valid for both
speci￿cations, columns (2) and (4), Table 5. As before, exchange rate e⁄ects seem not
to be determined by labour market rigidities for High-Tech industries. From column (2),
we also conclude in favour of the relevant role of GDP on employment movements in the
High-Tech economic activities. Although the estimate on this coe¢ cient has always been
positive, only under this particular speci￿cation of the model we obtain a statistically
signi￿cant result. Comparing to the Low-Tech estimate, the estimated coe¢ cient is
about 2/3, implying a lower e⁄ect of GDP the High-Tech labour market. Excluding
both openness and EPL on their own from the regression, column (4), GDP is again
statistically insigni￿cant, even though positive. One possible interpretation for these
results is that the degree of openness might be correlated with income levels. This way,
in Table 3, columns (3) and (5), most of the e⁄ect is captured by openness. By taking
￿rst-di⁄erences of openness, as well as of EPL, or by eliminating these two variables from
the model, we let GDP show its main e⁄ect, even for High-Tech.
Table 5: Employment regressions
Low-Tech High-Tech Low-Tech High-Tech
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
￿ExRatet￿1 -.0788 -.3653 -.1248 -.2313
(.1203) (.4154) (.1247) (.3687)
￿ExRate ￿ Opent￿1 1.2254￿￿￿ 1.6339￿ 1.3437￿￿￿ 1.4180￿
(.3713) (.8626) (.3844) (.7711)
￿ExRate ￿ EPLt￿1 -.1068￿￿ -.1365 -.0980￿￿ -.1592





￿ShareChinaWeightt￿1 -.0913 .3057 -.0846 .2868
(.1599) (.4552) (.1645) (.4568)
￿ShareChinat￿1 -.0745￿ -.3050 -.0794￿ -.2951
(.0438) (.2268) (.0467) (.2271)
￿ULCt￿1 -.1632￿￿￿ .0802 -.1582￿￿￿ .1520
(.0627) (.1525) (.0602) (.1821)
￿GDPt￿1 .8199￿￿￿ .5022￿ .7653￿￿￿ .3622
Continued on next page...
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Low-Tech High-Tech Low-Tech High-Tech
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
(.0948) (.2886) (.0951) (.2758)
￿InterestRatet￿1 -.0013 .00004 -.0013 -.0007
(.0009) (.0024) (.0009) (.0025)
Countries 23 23 23 23
Observations 3273 2400 3295 2428
Adj. R2 .1097 .0286 .1038 .0282
LogLikelihood 5417.134 1954.527 5412.136 1957.976
Notes: Signi￿cance levels: ￿ : 10% ￿￿ : 5% ￿ ￿ ￿ : 1%. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions are estimated by ￿xed-e⁄ects at
the sector/country level, and include time dummies. The dependent variable is
￿LogEmploymentjct.
In Table 6, the regressions used in the estimation of elasticities under (1) use ￿Open
and ￿EPL as explanatory variables - see columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 -, while the
regressions used in the estimation of elasticities under (2) do not use openness and EPL
on their own as explanatory variables - see columns (3) and (4) in Table 5. For very open
Low-Tech industries with rigid labour markets the employment exchange rate elasticity
is virtually the same presented in Table 4; i.e., 0:43. In this 2nd quadrant of Table
6 the elasticities increase with the exclusion of the testing variables, Open and EPL.
Moving to the 1st quadrant, very open High-Tech industries, we now get a clearer e⁄ect of
rigidities on the employment exchange rate elasticities. Once we have at least a median
level of ￿ exibility, exchange rate movements do impact on employment changes, even for
high productivity industries. We still con￿rm the previous results that the magnitude of
such e⁄ect is higher for Low-Tech. For example, excluding Open and EPL variables, last
column of Table 6, we conclude that a 1% depreciation leads to an increase of 0:67% in
employment in High-Tech and 0:77% in Low-Tech, second column of Table 6.
There is one result that deserves an additional comment. As we can see in Table 6,
columns (1) and (2) under Low-Tech, the employment exchange rate elasticity is negative
for Low-Tech closed sectors in face of a rigid labour market. A possible explanation might
be related with input costs ￿see, for example, Ekholm et al. (2008). However, we cannot
test such explanation as we lack appropriate data.
From our sensitivity analysis we con￿rm the previous conclusion that exchange rate
impacts on the labour market depends on the degree of labour market rigidity and the
industry￿ s openness and productivity.
23Table 6: Employment exchange rate elasticities
Low-Tech High-Tech
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Open(+)
EPL(+)
0.4273￿￿ 0.4970￿￿ 0.3304 0.2299
(0.0404) ( 0.0220) (0.3888) (0.5175)
0.5747￿￿￿ 0.6323￿￿￿ 0.5188￿￿ 0.4496￿
(0.0024) (0.0013) (0.0795) (0.0939)
EPL(-)
0.7211￿￿￿ 0.7666￿￿￿ 0.7057￿￿￿ 0.6676￿￿￿
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0065) (0.0054)
Open(-)
EPL(+)
-0.1765￿ -0.1650￿ -0.4746 -0.4688
(0.0759) (0.0972) (0.1167) (0.1237)
-0.0291 -0.0297 -0.2863 -0.2491
(0.6022) (0.5905) (0.1921) (0.2373)
EPL(-)
0.1173￿￿ 0.1046￿ -0.0993 -0.0310
(0.0385) (0.0657) (0.6358) (0.8697)
Notes: p ￿ values in parenthesis. Signi￿cance levels: ￿ : 10% ￿￿ : 5%
￿ ￿ ￿ : 1%. The regressions used in the estimation of elasticities under (1)
use ￿Open and ￿EPL as explanatory variables - see columns (1) and (2) in
Table 5. The regressions used in the estimation of elasticities under (2) do
not use ￿Open and ￿EPL as explanatory variables - see columns (3) and
(4) in Table 5.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of labour adjustment costs in the determination of the impact
of exchange rates on employment. The model of exporting ￿rm behaviour developed here
suggests that higher labour adjustment costs reduce the in￿ uence of exchange rate move-
ments on employment. This prediction receives support from our econometric analysis
based on a sample of 23 OECD countries.
Although there are some aspects that require further research, we believe we can
draw two conclusions from our work so far. First, the di⁄erence in labour market in-
stitutions is another variable that helps to understand the di⁄erent impact of exchange
rates on economic variables, such as employment (the focus of this paper), output and
prices, across countries. Second, the fact that higher labour adjustment costs appear to
reduce the elasticity of employment with respect to the exchange rate may have contra-
dictory macroeconomic implications. On the one hand, it may smooth unemployment
variations and, consequently, prevent some social costs associated with sharp increases in
unemployment, and even social unrest. However, it may also hinder e¢ cient reallocation
of resources. An assessment of these bene￿ts and costs is needed to help guide labour
market reforms.
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6 Appendix
Countries and Sectors
Table 7: Observations per country and technology level
Country Low-Tech High-Tech Country Low-Tech High-Tech
Austria￿ 118 100 Hungary 48 6
Belgium￿ 198 106 Italy￿ 202 170
Canada￿ 195 153 Japan￿ 192 159
Switzerland 81 54 South Korea￿ 48 40
Czech Republic 40 39 Netherlands￿ 153 112
Germany 176 142 Norway￿ 185 147
Denmark￿ 193 137 Poland 40 5
Spain￿ 197 158 Portugal￿ 151 110
Finland￿ 202 159 Slovakia 44 40
France￿ 202 170 Sweden￿ 202 168
United Kingdom￿ 136 17 United States￿ 180 150
Greece￿ 112 86
Low-Tech High-Tech
Total observations 3295 2428
Note: OECD23 refers to all countries presented in tableOECD17 refers to countries marked with ￿.
27Table 8: List of sectors used in the analysis
ISIC Rev. 3 Descritpion Technology Classi￿cation
15-16 Food products, beverages and tobacco Low and Medium Low Technology
17-19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear Low and Medium Low Technology
20 Wood and products of wood and cork Low and Medium Low Technology
21-22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing Low and Medium Low Technology
23 Coke, re￿ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel Low and Medium Low Technology
24 less 2423 Chemicals excluding phamaceuticals High and Medium High Technology
2423 Pharmaceuticals High and Medium High Technology
25 Rubber and plastics products Low and Medium Low Technology
26 Other non-metallic mineral products Low and Medium Low Technology
271+2731 Iron and steel Low and Medium Low Technology
272+2732 Non-ferrous metals Low and Medium Low Technology
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment Low and Medium Low Technology
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. High and Medium High Technology
30 O¢ ce, accounting and computing machinery High and Medium High Technology
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. High and Medium High Technology
32 Radio, television and communication equipment High and Medium High Technology
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments High and Medium High Technology
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers High and Medium High Technology
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats Low and Medium Low Technology
352+359 Railroad equipment and transport equipment n.e.c. High and Medium High Technology
353 Aircraft and spacecraft High and Medium High Technology
36-37 Manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling Low and Medium Low Technology
Variables
Table 9: Variables description
Variable Descritpion Source
y Number of employees (full and part-
time)
OECD STAN: EMPN
ExRate See next sub-section
Open exports plus imports over gross output
plus exports and imports; all variables
measured in national currency, current
prices
OECD STAN: EXPO, IMPO and
PROD
EPL OECD￿ s employment protection legisla-
tion index
OECD Indicators on Employment Pro-
tection - annual time series data 1985-
2008: Unweighted average of ver-
sion 1 sub-indicators for regular con-
tracts (EPRv1) and temporary con-
tracts (EPTv1)
ShareChinaj Share of imports from China in sector
j own country￿imports
OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database
Continued on next page...
28... table 9 continued
Variable Descritpion Source
Share_ChinaWj;c;t￿1 weighted average of the share of
Chinese imports in OECD countries,
where weights are de￿ned as the share





c;t) stands for exports (imports)
from country c to country i, in sector
j (in year t)): see note
OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database
ULC Unit labour costs: measure the average
cost of labour per unit of output and are
calculated as the ratio of total labour
costs to real output
OECD STAN Database, variable:
"ULC - total economy, annual". ULC
was de￿ ated using OECD￿ s consumer
price indexes (2005=100)
GDP Gross domestic product, constant
prices
OECD STAN Database
IntRate Long-term interest rates, per cent per
annum
OECD STAN Database, variable: "In-









































is the bilateral real exchange rate between country c and country i, ei;t is the price of
foreign currency i in terms of country c currency at time t, pc;t and pi;t are consumer
price indexes for the country c economy and for economy i, N(t) is the number of foreign
currencies in the index at time t and w
i;j
c;t is the weight of currency i in the index of




c;t = 1. An increase in the value of this index corresponds
to a real depreciation of the country c currency. The base of the index is the year 2000.
The nominal exchange rates (national currency per US dollar at the end of the period)
and consumer price indexes were collected from IMF International Financial Statistics
database.
29We computed exchange rate weights in order to include information that would allow
us to take into account for sectoral third-party competition. We followed Turner and
Van￿ t dack (1993) and de￿ned the weight w
j;i
c;t given to i￿ s country currency in the double-

































































































c;t) stands for exports (imports) from country c to country i,
in sector j (in year t).



















































































Figure 7: Employment exchange rate elasticity: labour adjustment costs and openness
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Figure 9: Employment exchange rate elasticity: labour adjustment costs and exchange
rate persistence
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